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INTRODUCTION 
“Because the law says we can do it” was the response that Officer 
Griffith offered when asked why officers searched Rodney Gant’s car when 
he was arrested for driving with a suspended license.
1
  Officer Griffith’s 
honest answer exemplifies the effect of prior Supreme Court decisions on 
search incident to arrest power in the vehicle context:  that a search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest is a police entitlement divorced from any rationale 
whatsoever.
2
  The legal justifications that permit warrantless searches 
incident to arrest generally, concerns for officer safety and preservation of 
evidence,
3
 had been utterly abandoned by the Court in the automobile 
context.
4
  This police entitlement led to invasions of privacy against 
persons guilty of no more than mere traffic violations as searches were 
conducted simply because they were legally permissible.
5
  However, the 
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant
6
 shifted course and strengthened Fourth 
Amendment protections by terminating the entitlement that permitted 
vehicle searches incident to arrest as a matter of right.
7
 
The tumultuous jurisprudence of the search incident to arrest doctrine 
under the Fourth Amendment
8
 has often produced inconsistent and varied 
                                                           
 1. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1715 (2009). 
 2. See id. at 1721 (recognizing that prior cases created a bright-line rule allowing a 
vehicle search incident to arrest regardless of any reason); see also Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (lamenting lower court 
decisions that deem a search of a vehicle incident to arrest as a right of the police rather than 
as an exception to the warrant requirement that is justified only by a threat of harm to the 
officers or destruction of evidence); James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the 
Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine:  Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and 
Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 1417, 1436 (2007) (arguing that a bright-line rule for searches 
incident to arrest was meant to extend to all vehicular arrests). 
 3. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1969) (disallowing a search of an 
entire house incident to arrest as it was not justified by a need to reduce a risk of officer 
safety or destruction of evidence by the arrestee). 
 4. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (establishing a bright-line rule 
permitting searches of vehicles incident to arrest in all circumstances, yet claiming fidelity 
to Chimel); see also Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, due to 
Belton, many lower courts have upheld vehicle searches incident to arrest when the arrestee 
was handcuffed and secured in a police car); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking 
Point:  Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon an 
Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
77, 80 (2007) [hereinafter Bright Line] (asserting that Belton created a bright-line rule 
permitting vehicle searches incident to arrest regardless of the crime for which the vehicle’s 
occupant was arrested, and irrespective of the likelihood that the arrestee could access the 
car to reach a weapon or destructible evidence). 
 5. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722–23 (deploring invasions of privacy against those who 
were arrested for committing minor traffic offenses); cf. Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:  Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime 
of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 407 (2004) (asserting that the “worst feature” of the 
Belton decision was the incentive it created for police to arrest in order to execute their 
“broad search power”).  
 6. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 7. See infra Part IV (arguing that Gant overrules the bright-line automatic search rule). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The text of the Amendment reads: 
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results.
9
  In keeping with this tradition, the Supreme Court in Gant revised 
nearly thirty years of search incident to arrest law in the automobile 
context.
10
  Unlike Gant’s predecessors, Gant generally enhanced Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches
11
 by holding that 
automatic vehicle searches incident to arrest are unconstitutional.
12
  On the 
other hand, Gant’s second holding created a new warrant exception to 
govern searches of automobiles incident to arrest by allowing officers to 
search a vehicle, even when the justifications of officer safety and 
preservation of evidence are nonexistent.
13
 
This Comment argues that Gant not only enhances Fourth Amendment 
protections overall by limiting authority to search an automobile upon 
arrest, but that its first holding also undermines other cases permitting 
automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular situations.
14
  Gant’s 
affirmation of two specific rationales that permit a search incident to 
                                                                                                                                      
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
 9. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1421–27 (tracing the history of search incident to 
arrest law and outlining the Court’s rapid expansions and retractions of search incident to 
arrest power); see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (describing the “checkered history” of 
search incident to arrest law). 
 10. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority 
opinion overruled twenty-eight year old precedent). 
 11. See Bright Line, supra note 4, at 103 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s approach, later 
adopted in Gant, would abandon automatic searches and thereby reduce the incentive for 
pretextual arrests motivated by a desire to search).  But see, e.g., David S. Rudstein, Belton 
Redux:  Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident 
to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1287, 1345–46 (2005) (dismissing Justice Scalia’s 
approach, later adopted in Gant, as insufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights).  
Gant furthers Fourth Amendment privacy protections vis-à-vis the automatic vehicle search 
rule.  See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (refusing to construe prior case law broadly in order to 
enhance Fourth Amendment privacy protections). 
 12. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (stating that automatic vehicle searches incident to 
arrest are police entitlements that are “anathema” to the Fourth Amendment). 
 13. See id. at 1719 (holding that a search of a vehicle incident to arrest is permissible 
when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in the 
vehicle);  Jason Hermele, Comment, Arizona v. Gant:  Rethinking the Evidence-Gathering 
Justification for the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, and Testing a ew Approach, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 195 (2009) (noting that Gant reigns in expansive search incident to 
arrest power, but adopts a new evidence gathering rationale that is not governed by probable 
cause). 
 14. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (allowing law enforcement to 
automatically search closets and areas adjoining the place of arrest); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (formalizing the power to automatically search a 
person and containers on the person incident to arrest by reasoning that a lawful arrest itself 
creates search authority); United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(utilizing a test that always permits a search of the place of arrest in the home context); see 
infra Part IV (arguing that Gant undermines the authority to automatically search containers 
on the person incident to arrest); infra Part V (arguing that Gant abrogates automatic 
searches incident to arrest in the home). 
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arrest,
15
 officer safety and the preservation of evidence, directly conflicts 
with nonvehicular cases allowing automatic searches irrespective of these 
rationales.
16
  Since Gant undermines such cases by reconnecting the search 
incident to arrest exception with its justifications, applying Gant to cases 
that permit automatic searches of containers on the person,
17
 and certain 
automatic home searches incident to arrest, serves to enhance privacy 
protections against these nonvehicular searches that have become police 
entitlements.
18
 
Part I outlines the judicial origin of search incident to arrest law and its 
schizophrenic history.  This Part will also expose the fundamental conflict 
between the cases and discuss the legal rules and reasoning of Gant.  Part II 
argues that the standard governing Gant’s second holding is vague, and is 
concerned with whether the crime of arrest involves tangible evidence 
rather than a quantum of proof analysis prevalent in standards such as 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion.  Part III analyzes the effect of 
applying Gant’s first holding to an automatic search of containers on the 
person incident to arrest, while Part IV applies Gant to certain automatic 
home searches incident to arrest.  Part IV also addresses some 
counterarguments and potential pitfalls.  This Comment concludes that 
Gant’s retraction of the search incident to arrest power may serve to end, or 
at the least severely undermine, automatic searches of containers on the 
person and homes incident to arrest. 
I. INTRODUCING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION AND 
GAT 
In numerous opinions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to require a warrant for a search.
19
  Nevertheless, the general 
                                                           
 15. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (rejecting a rule permitting automatic vehicle searches 
because such a rule cannot be justified by the twin rationales of officer safety and 
preservation of evidence as established by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). 
 16. See cases cited supra note 14 (providing examples of nonvehicular cases in which 
courts have allowed automatic searches).  
 17. For purposes of this Comment, containers on the person include containers found in 
a search of an arrestee’s clothing, such as a cigarette pack.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236.  
Containers on the person also include purses, backpacks, and other containers “immediately 
associated,” or somehow connected to, the individual.  United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 15 (1977). Courts have used Robinson and Belton to support automatic searches of 
personal bags and briefcases.  See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 923 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 
1991) (bags); United States v. Herrera, 810 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1987) (briefcase). 
 18. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1003 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(suppressing evidence from a home search by applying Gant); United States v. Perdoma, 
No. 8:08cr00460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to a 
search of a nonvehicular arrestee’s bag). 
 19. See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (stating that the Fourth Amendment requires a 
magistrate to assess the legal justification of a search before it takes place); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that warrantless searches are unreasonable per se 
and are “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”); 
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rule that a warrantless search is unconstitutional has been significantly 
weakened by a plethora of exceptions that have greatly expanded the power 
of police to conduct warrantless searches.
20
  One such exception is a search 
incident to arrest.
21
  The history of search incident to arrest law is often 
contradictory as the Supreme Court has variously expanded and retracted 
police authority to conduct such a search.
22
 
A. Origins of the Search Incident to Arrest Exception  
The Court first recognized search incident to arrest power in dictum in 
Weeks v. United States
23
 and subsequent cases drew from Weeks to further 
establish this law enforcement “right” to search.
24
  After rapid expansion 
and contraction of the search incident to arrest authority,
25
 the Court settled 
on an expansive search power in United States v. Rabinowitz.
26
 
                                                                                                                                      
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357) (holding that 
it is a “cardinal principle” that warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment”).  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762–63 (1994) (discussing the warrant requirement and 
its variants).    
 20. E.g., Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (listing certain emergencies, such 
as hot pursuit of a felon, that would allow a warrantless entry of a home); Chimel, 395 U.S. 
at 755–60 (tracing the history of the search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a limited warrantless pat-down search for reasons of officer 
safety); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (permitting a warrantless 
search based on the exigency of the destruction of evidence); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (creating the automobile exception and upholding a warrantless 
automobile search supported by probable cause); see also Edwin Butterfoss, As Time Goes 
By:  The Elimination of Contemporaneity and Brevity as Factors in Search and Seizure 
Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 603, 604 (1986) [hereinafter As Time Goes By] (arguing 
that expansions of various exceptions to the warrant requirement have diminished the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment). 
 21. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that a search incident to arrest is not the government’s right, but an exception 
that is only justified by certain necessities). 
 22. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1419 (analogizing the shrinking and expanding of 
search incident authority to a pendulum swinging back and forth). 
 23. See 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (recognizing the “right on the part of the government 
. . . to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits 
or evidences of crime”). 
 24. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging the flaws of relying on Weeks to establish search incident to arrest authority 
by stating that such power was “loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a 
decision”).  See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1421–26 (discussing the origins of 
the exception). 
 25. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1423–26 (describing the rapid and unpredictable 
expansions and contractions of the search incident to arrest exception); see also Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. at 67 (Black, J., dissenting) (lamenting the uncertainty regarding the scope of the 
search incident to arrest power in preceding years).  For example, the Court in Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), articulated a broad authority by upholding a search of 
an entire apartment incident to arrest, whereas the Court reversed course the next year in 
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), by insisting that the search incident to arrest 
power must be strictly limited.  Almost twenty years later, the Court returned to Harris only 
to limit the search incident power in Chimel.  The Court proceeded to expand this power 
after Chimel only to rein it back in Gant.  See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1427 n.66 (noting 
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The Rabinowitz Court upheld the search of a home based on law 
enforcement’s interest in discovering evidence of the crime of arrest,
27
 in 
this case, stamp forgery, and determined that Fourth Amendment 
adjudication should not be governed by a general warrant requirement, but 
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the search was reasonable.
28
  
Rabinowitz remained good law for nineteen years until the Court took a 
dramatic turn and rejected Rabinowitz’s broad search authority, which was 
premised on law enforcement’s need to discover evidence. 
In Chimel v. California,
29
 the defendant was arrested in his home, 
pursuant to an arrest warrant, for burglarizing a coin shop.
30
  Subsequently, 
the officers searched the entire house over the objection of arrestee Chimel, 
and ordered his wife to open drawers located in the master bedroom.
31
  The 
Court held that this search violated the Fourth Amendment and established 
a new rule to govern searches incident to arrest.
32
  Overruling Rabinowitz,
33
 
the Court stated that a search incident to arrest may only extend to the area 
within the arrestee’s immediate control, or reaching distance, from where 
she might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.
34
  These twin 
rationales, officer safety and preservation of evidence, underpin the 
authority to search within the arrestee’s reaching area.
35
 
The Court reasoned that warrantless searches, like in Rabinowitz, 
generally contradict the original purpose of the Fourth Amendment:  to 
guard against warrantless searches and general warrant searches, like the 
British conducted of the colonists’ homes.
36
  The Chimel Court emphasized 
                                                                                                                                      
that the more than thirty-five years since Chimel was decided had been marked by an 
expansion of search incident to arrest authority).    
 26. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
 27. See id. at 65 (permitting a warrantless home search for the purpose of discovering 
evidence, as opposed to another rationale such as officer safety); see also Thornton v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Rabinowitz 
Court relied on the interest in gathering evidence to uphold a warrantless search of a home). 
 28. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 66 (“The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to 
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.  That criterion in turn 
depends upon the facts and circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case.”). 
 29. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 30. Id. at 753. 
 31. Id. at 754. 
 32. Id. at 768. 
 33. See id. (overruling Rabinowitz to the extent that it is inconsistent with the Chimel 
rule). 
 34. Id. at 763.  The area of immediate control is also known as the “lunge area.”  Leslie 
A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines:  Belton and Its Progeny, 
79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 396 (2004).  Furthermore, the rationales underpinning the search, 
officer safety and the preservation of evidence, are often referred to as Chimel’s twin 
rationales.  E.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1417. 
 35. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763; see also As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 604 (citing 
cases requiring warrant exceptions to be “narrowly tailored to the circumstances that justify 
their creation”); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1428 (stating that the majority’s belief in the 
warrant requirement lead it to limit warrant exceptions to specific rationales). 
 36. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 760–61. 
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the importance of obtaining a warrant before a search and therefore 
restricted the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement 
to the reaching area, justified by the twin rationales of officer safety and 
preservation of evidence.
37
   
A possible explanation for the difference in outcomes between 
Rabinowitz and Chimel is that the cases fundamentally differ on whether 
the Fourth Amendment presumes a warrantless search to be 
impermissible.
38
  The Chimel Court believed that the Fourth Amendment 
generally required a warrant for a search,
39
 and that any exception would 
have to be narrow in scope and strictly tied to the rationales that justify the 
exception.
40
  On the other hand, the Rabinowitz Court did not believe in the 
warrant presumption, and was guided by the reasonableness clause of the 
Fourth Amendment where the permissibility of searches must be 
determined by a general reasonableness standard.
41
 
B. The Emergence of Bright-Line Rules 
While Chimel firmly established the rationales for the search incident to 
arrest exception, the Court four years later permitted an automatic search of 
the person and containers on the person incident to arrest in United States 
v. Robinson.
42
  In Robinson, the defendant was lawfully arrested for driving 
with a revoked license.
43
  Upon patting down Robinson, the officer felt a 
crumpled cigarette pack in his coat pocket and removed it.
44
  The officer 
felt that its contents were not cigarettes, and opened it to discover fourteen 
                                                           
 37. See id. at 763 (stating that no justification comparable to the twin rationales exists 
to support a warrantless search of a home incident to arrest).  Note that the preservation of 
evidence rationale seeks to prevent the arrestee from obtaining and destroying evidence 
upon arrest whereas the discovery of evidence rationale, as upheld in Rabinowitz, relates to 
searches for evidence of crime even when the arrestee cannot reach destructible evidence. 
 38. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 224–25 (3d ed. 
2002) (noting that the holdings in both Chimel and Robinson result from differing Fourth 
Amendment analyses since the Chimel Court was concerned about the scope of a warrant 
exception whereas the Robinson Court de-emphasized the warrant requirement).  Compare 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (rejecting a per se warrant requirement 
and supporting a general reasonableness approach to Fourth Amendment adjudication), with 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764–65 (asserting that a general reasonableness standard is devoid of 
meaning and the reasonableness argument is founded on a “subjective view regarding the 
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct”). 
 39. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761 (“In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the 
requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part.” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). 
 40. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 761–62; see also As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 604 
(arguing that warrant exceptions must be strictly confined to the rationales that justify their 
existence). 
 41. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65–66; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1425 
(discussing Rabinowitz’s rejection of a rule requiring warrants whenever practicable). 
 42. 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 43. Id. at 220. 
 44. Id. at 222–23. 
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heroin capsules.
45
  The Court stated that the search of Robinson’s person 
and the cigarette pack were constitutional based on reasons of officer safety 
and discovery of evidence.
46
  Despite these reasons, Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, held that a lawful arrest provides the authority to 
search and that a search of a person incident to a lawful arrest needs no 
further justification.
47
  The Court also stated that a “more fundamental” 
reason for upholding the search is that precedent does not support a case-
by-case adjudication of the lawfulness of the search of a person incident to 
arrest.
48
  In other words, the Court created the power of an automatic search 
by virtue of an arrest, irrespective of whether the arrestee could possibly 
reach into the container to grab a weapon to harm the officer or destroy 
evidence.
49
 
Not only did the Court establish a bright-line rule permitting automatic 
searches of a person and containers on a person incident to arrest, but later 
also upheld automatic searches in the home context.  For example, the 
Court in Maryland v. Buie
50
 held that upon arrest, police may search closets 
and other areas “immediately adjoining the place of arrest” from where a 
person may attack.
51
  The basis for this so-called protective sweep is officer 
safety; however, the Court held that no rationale is needed to conduct the 
automatic sweep, not even an officer’s subjective belief that there may be a 
hiding person who presents a danger to officer safety.
52
   
Another case that created an automatic search power incident to arrest in 
the home is United States v. Turner.
53
  In Turner, police obtained an arrest 
warrant for Turner for distributing crack cocaine and possessing a firearm 
while committing a drug crime.
54
  The officers forced their way into the 
apartment and discovered Turner in bed with a woman and a revolver by 
his side.
55
  Turner was handcuffed and taken into the other room for officer 
                                                           
 45. Id. at 223. 
 46. Id. at 235. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1432 (arguing that a Robinson search of a 
person incident to arrest does not require a danger that the arrestee might harm the officer or 
obtain destructible evidence). 
 49. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that it is the fact of a lawful arrest that 
provides the authority to search); see also Kelly A. Deters, Note, The “Evaporation Point”:  
State v. Sykes and the Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Through the Search-Incident-to-
Arrest Exception, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1901, 1913 (2007) (arguing that Robinson permits a 
search irrespective of the twin rationales and therefore violates privacy protections as it 
allows a warrantless search when there is no exigency to justify it). 
 50. 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 51. Id. at 334. 
 52. See id. (allowing a search of closets and spaces immediately adjoining arrest 
without requiring probable cause or reasonable suspicion). 
 53. 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 54. Id. at 885. 
 55. Id. at 886. 
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safety.
56
  With Turner detained in the adjacent room, the officers searched 
the room of arrest and found firearms and crack cocaine.
57
  The Ninth 
Circuit upheld the search, determining that the contraband was within 
Turner’s immediate control when he was arrested, and asserting that it was 
of no consequence that he was not within reaching distance at the time of 
the search.
58
  While claiming consistency with Chimel, the court in Turner 
did not apply Chimel’s essential logic because the arrestee in Turner was 
handcuffed, under the control of the police, and not in reaching distance of 
the searched area at the time of the search was conducted.
59
 
Consistent with its historical vacillations on the scope of searches 
incident to arrest, the Supreme Court sharply broke from Chimel in ew 
York v. Belton.
60
  In Belton, an officer stopped a car for speeding and upon 
smelling marijuana and observing an envelope marked “Supergold,” which 
he associated with the drug, ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle.
61
  
The officer then arrested the car’s occupants for possession of marijuana 
and searched the car incident to the arrest, finding marijuana in the 
envelope and cocaine in Belton’s jacket, which was inside the car.
62
  The 
Court announced that Chimel was difficult to apply to automobiles because 
lower courts were confused on whether Chimel permitted a search of the 
vehicle after its occupants were no longer inside it.
63
  Stressing the 
importance of providing law enforcement with a clear, bright-line rule, the 
Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that 
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.”
64
  The Court 
looked favorably upon the bright-line rule Robinson created, providing 
                                                           
 56. Id. at 888. 
 57. Id. at 886. 
 58. See id. at 887–88 (adopting the Seventh Circuit approach by asking whether the 
evidence or weapons were within the immediate control of the arrestee at the time of arrest, 
and whether any events between the arrest and search made the search unreasonable). 
 59. Compare Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that officers may 
search, incident to arrest, the area where an arrestee might gain access to weapons or 
destructible evidence), with Turner, 926 F.2d at 888 (upholding a search of a room when the 
arrestee was not in reaching distance by analyzing whether the arrestee was in reach of 
weapons or destructible evidence at the time of arrest, as opposed to the time of the search). 
 60. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 61. Id. at 455–56. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 459; see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that Chimel’s rule is difficult for officers to apply in the field). 
 64. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.  Courts have required, at least in theory, that the search 
must be contemporaneous, or at least substantially contemporaneous, to an arrest in order 
for it to be incident to that arrest.  The contemporaneity requirement is essential if the search 
is to qualify as incident to arrest.  See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) 
(holding that a search of a footlocker more than an hour after an arrest was not 
contemporaneous and thus not a search incident to arrest); Preston v. United States, 376 
U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (holding that a search conducted after an arrest and in a location 
beyond that of the arrest cannot fall under search incident to arrest doctrine).  
SINGH_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:48 AM 
1768 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1759 
officers the authority to search a person, and his containers, incident to 
arrest as a matter of right, and lamented that such a clear rule had not 
emerged in the vehicular context.
65
   
In his Belton dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that the majority 
created a bright-line rule authorizing automatic searches that disregarded 
Chimel’s twin rationales.
66
  In order to maintain the illusion that it was 
applying Chimel to the present facts, the Court created a legal fiction which 
presumes that arrestees are generally within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle, thereby automatically triggering 
Chimel’s twin rationales to justify a search.
67
 
The Court revisited Belton in Thornton v. United States,
68
 where it 
upheld a search of a recent occupant of a vehicle who had alighted from the 
vehicle just before arrest.
69
  The majority upheld the search even though 
Thornton was handcuffed and placed in the squad car before the search, 
thereby affirming Belton’s bright-line rule.
70
 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to present 
his differing approach to searches of vehicles incident to arrest.
71
  He 
rejected Belton’s legal fiction and asserted that the risk of Thornton 
escaping from the squad car, in handcuffs, to retrieve a weapon or evidence 
from his car was “remote in the extreme.”
72
  In asserting that such 
warrantless searches are exceptions to a warrant requirement, rather than 
police entitlements,
73
 Justice Scalia’s concurrence affirmed Chimel and 
                                                           
 65. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459 (noting that Robinson rejected the argument that 
searches of persons incident to arrest must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis and that 
lower courts have had difficulty in individual adjudication of searches of automobiles 
incident to arrest). 
 66. See id. at 464–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority had created 
an arbitrary bright-line rule that disregarded the policy reasons underlying Chimel’s 
holding). 
 67. See id. at 460 (majority opinion) (creating “the generalization that articles inside the 
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact 
generally, even if not inevitably, within” the immediate control of the arrestee); see also 
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason:  An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel 
and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 674 (2002) [hereinafter An Empirical Reexamination] 
(arguing that Belton’s legal fiction is wrong in light of routine police procedures that secure 
and remove the arrestee from the car); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1434 (stating that Belton 
created a legal fiction that a recent occupant who is no longer in the vehicle can gain access 
to weapons or destructible evidence within the vehicle). 
 68. 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 623–24. 
 70. Id. at 623. 
 71. See id. at 625–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (delineating his opposing view on search 
incident to arrest doctrine). 
 72. Id. at 625.  Justice Scalia recognized that, by creating a rule where an arrestee is 
presumed to always be able to access the vehicle, Belton created a “mythical  
arrestee ‘possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules.’”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 73. See id. at 627 (“[C]onducting a Chimel search is not the Government’s right; it is an 
exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render the search 
unlawful.”). 
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expressed concern that pretextual arrests allowed officers to rummage 
through an individual’s personal property.
74
  However, Justice Scalia 
continued that even when the arrestee is not within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle, he would nevertheless permit a 
search if it were “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest might be found in the vehicle.”
75
 
Justice Scalia based this rule upon the evidence-gathering rationale from 
cases such as Rabinowitz,
76
 but did not acknowledge that Chimel overruled 
Rabinowitz.
77
  He also justified his rule by reasoning that permitting such a 
vehicular search is not rummaging, presumably because an officer would 
be searching for evidence of the crime of arrest as opposed to conducting a 
general automobile search in order to discover some other criminal 
evidence.
78
 
C. Gant’s Retraction of Search Incident to Arrest Power 
Justice Scalia’s approach became law in Arizona v. Gant.
79
  In Gant, 
Tucson police officers discovered an arrest warrant for Rodney Gant, for 
driving with a suspended license, during a drug trafficking investigation.
80
  
The officers arrested, handcuffed, and placed Gant in a squad car before 
conducting a Belton search of his vehicle, whereupon they uncovered a gun 
and cocaine.
81
  Without expressly overruling Belton, the Court rejected 
what it deemed to be a broad reading of that case, which granted automatic 
search power, by reasoning that such an interpretation contradicts Chimel’s 
twin rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence.
82
 
The Court affirmed Chimel’s rule by asserting that it only allows a 
search of the passenger compartment of a car when the arrestee is 
“unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search.”
83
  The Court found that Belton violated Chimel’s 
                                                           
 74. See id. at 627–29 (arguing that searches cannot merely be exploratory; police 
officers must have an objective or reason for the search). 
 75. Id. at 632. 
 76. See id. at 630 (“There is nothing irrational about broader police authority to search 
for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested.”). 
 77. Id. at 629.  
 78. See id. at 630 (stating that searching for a evidence of a specific crime incident to 
arrest is not “general rummaging”). 
 79. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).  The Court stated: 
Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States . . . and following the 
suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case . . . 
we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a 
search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the 
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 1714–15. 
 81. Id. at 1715. 
 82. Id. at 1719. 
 83. Id. 
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core principles, including Chimel’s holding that a warrantless search 
exception to the warrant requirement must be strictly linked to its 
rationales.
84
  Because Rodney Gant was handcuffed and inside the police 
cruiser, his ability to retrieve a weapon or evidence from his car was 
nonexistent.
85
  Therefore, the Court held that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment because the rationales underlying the search incident to arrest 
exception were lacking.
86
 
In Gant, the Court affirmed Chimel, but also adopted Justice Scalia’s 
novel approach from Thornton that when the arrestee is not within reaching 
distance of the vehicle, a search is still permissible if it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the 
automobile.
87
  The Court expressly limited this second holding to the 
automobile context by stating that “circumstances unique” to this context 
justify a search for evidence of the crime of arrest.
88
 
As in Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, the Court was concerned 
about the power of police to rummage among an individual’s private 
property
89
 and declared that an interpretation of Belton that gave police the 
right to automatically search is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment.”
90
  
Furthermore, the fact that Belton and Thornton permitted automatic 
searches of an arrestee’s car, even for those arrested for mere traffic 
violations, deeply concerned the Court.
91
 
Notably, Justice Scalia concurred with the majority, rather than joining 
its opinion, even though the Court essentially adopted his Thornton 
concurrence.
92
  In his Gant concurrence, Justice Scalia expressed a 
dissatisfaction with Chimel that he did not express in Thornton:  that 
Chimel fails to give appropriate guidelines to arresting officers given the 
ambiguity in what constitutes an arrestee’s reaching distance.
93
  He argued 
that Chimel “leaves much room for manipulation, inviting officers to leave 
the scene unsecured (at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) in 
                                                           
 84. See id. at 1716 (“[Chimel’s] limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of 
the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its 
purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of 
arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy.”). 
 85. See id. at 1719 (acknowledging that Gant “was not within reaching distance of his 
car at the time of the search”). 
 86. See id. at 1716 (declaring the search unreasonable because Gant was not within 
reaching distance of his car, and no evidence of the crime of arrest, driving with a suspended 
license, could logically exist). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(holding that Gant’s evidentiary holding is limited to the vehicular context). 
 89. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720. 
 90. Id. at 1721. 
 91. See id. at 1722–23 (noting that these cases resulted in numerous constitutional right 
violations of those who were guilty of mere traffic violations). 
 92. Id. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. at 1724. 
SINGH_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 9/3/2010  10:48 AM 
2010] STEPPING OUT OF THE VEHICLE 1771 
order to conduct a vehicle search.”
94
  Interestingly, Justice Scalia dismissed 
this perverse incentive argument in Thornton by arguing that if officers do 
not follow safe procedures by failing to secure or remove an arrestee from 
the scene of the arrest, then the search would automatically be 
unconstitutional.
95
  Justice Scalia’s latest position, reflected in his Gant 
concurrence, is that a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment “only when the object of the search is evidence of the 
crime for which the arrest was made, or of another crime that the officer 
has probable cause to believe occurred.”
96
  Justice Scalia reasoned that 
since Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, a 
nonevidentiary crime where a search incident to arrest could not possibly 
discover evidence of the crime, and since no probable cause of another 
crime existed, the search was unreasonable.
97
 
While the Court clearly abolished Belton’s legal fiction by affirming 
Chimel’s twin rationales, it left unclear what exactly the “reasonable to 
believe” standard entails.
98
 
II. GAT’S REASONABLE TO BELIEVE STANDARD PERTAINS TO THE 
EVIDENTIARY NATURE OF THE CRIME 
By adopting Justice Scalia’s approach from Thornton, the Court opted 
for a reasonable to believe standard that varies from the familiar standards 
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
99
  However, the Court was not 
explicit about what such a standard entails and failed to define it.
100
  A 
                                                           
 94. Id. at 1724–25. 
 95. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004).  Justice Scalia asserted 
that “if an officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to 
search, one could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because the dangerous 
conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer’s failure to follow sensible 
procedures.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 96. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1723–24 (holding that a search incident to arrest is unconstitutional where 
Chimel’s twin rationales are absent, or where it is not reasonable to believe that evidence of 
the crime of arrest could be found in the vehicle).  
 99. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 7.1(d), at 109 (4th ed. Supp. 2009) (noting that the adoption of this standard 
was a “dramatic change in the law”); Rudstein, supra note 11, at 1345 (arguing that 
reasonable to believe is not probable cause); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1464 (same); Orin 
Kerr, When Is It “Reasonable to Believe” That Evidence  
Relevant to An Offense is In A Car?  Does that Require Probable Cause, Reasonable  
Suspicion, or Something Else?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Apr. 22, 2009, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2009_04_19-2009_04_25.shtml#1240453456 
(recognizing the uncertainty associated with a reasonable to believe standard); see also 
Dripps, supra note 5, at 404 (contending that reasonable to believe is a vague standard less 
than probable cause, and that the Court might eventually equate it with reasonable 
suspicion).  
 100. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1729 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is unclear when 
the reasonable to believe standard will permit a search); see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 
7.1(d), at 111 (observing that Gant provided only an “adumbrated treatment” of the 
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logical place to seek guidance about this standard’s meaning is Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton because the Court in Gant expressly 
adopted the standard from this concurrence.
101
  Unfortunately, Justice 
Scalia’s Thornton concurrence does not provide a definition of the standard 
either, leaving lower courts, police officers, and commentators to guess at 
its precise meaning.
102
 
Other cases have articulated a standard such as reasonable to believe, or 
reason to believe, but they too provide little guidance.
103
  Adding to the 
confusion, various cases have equated the reasonable to believe, or 
reasonable belief, standard with either reasonable suspicion
104
 or probable 
cause.
105
  Nevertheless, this standard is not equivalent to probable cause 
because the automobile exception already provides for warrantless vehicle 
searches based solely on probable cause.
106
  The automobile exception 
pertains to car searches before
107
 or after an arrest,
108
 rather than a 
                                                                                                                                      
standard). 
 101. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (adopting the reasonable to believe standard by 
directly quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton).   
 102. See id. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the new standard will confuse 
police officers and judges); Kerr, supra note 99 (determining that Justice Scalia’s Thornton 
concurrence, and other cases, provide little guidance regarding the meaning of “reasonable 
to believe,” leaving the author unsure of the standard’s definition); see also Kit Kinports, 
Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 657 
(2009) (arguing that undefined standards such as reasonable to believe should be adopted, if 
at all, with transparency and better guidance).  
 103. E.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (allowing a warrantless 
home entry if there is an “objectively reasonable basis” that a house occupant is severely 
injured, without elaborating on the standard); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (articulating a reasonable to believe standard without 
elaborating on its contours); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (upholding 
entrance into a home with an arrest warrant where “there is reason to believe the suspect is 
within”); see also Kinports, supra note 102, at 649 (stating that the Court has used language 
such as “reason[able] to believe” without definition or explanation of its relationship to 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause). 
 104. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (upholding protective house 
sweeps based on reasonable suspicion and requiring that the police have “a reasonable 
belief” that an attacker is hiding in the area swept); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968) 
(stating that an officer may frisk a suspect if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion, or a 
“reason to believe” the suspect is armed and dangerous). 
 105. E.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (proclaiming that the substance 
of probable cause is a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt”) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 233 n.7 (1983) (describing probable cause to arrest as a “reasonable belief” that 
the arrestee had committed a crime). 
 106. Kinports, supra note 102, at 651; LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d), at 110–11.  See 
generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155–56 (1925) (holding that a warrantless 
automobile search supported by probable cause of a crime is lawful). 
 107. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 155–56 (upholding the search and seizure of contraband 
liquor upon probable cause, which then led to arrest); see also California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 395 (1985) (upholding a warrantless search of a mobile home before arrest based 
on the automobile exception). 
 108. E.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1985) (holding that a car search 
conducted three days after the arrest of a driver and seizure of his car was reasonable); 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47 (1970) (permitting a car search based on the 
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substantially contemporaneous search incident to arrest, so that the two 
doctrines of search incident to arrest and the automobile exception would 
blend into each other if probable cause were equated with Gant’s 
reasonable to believe standard.  Since equating reasonable to believe with 
probable cause would be redundant in light of the preexisting automobile 
exception, it is unlikely that the Court intended to equate the two 
standards.
109
 
Furthermore, it is also unlikely that the Court intended to equate this 
standard with reasonable suspicion.  In abolishing the bright-line Belton 
rule, the Court found that ample authority exists to search a car for reasons 
of officer safety.
110
  Justice Stevens acknowledged that Michigan v. Long
111
 
permits a search of a vehicle if there is reasonable suspicion that an 
occupant is dangerous and might grab a weapon,
112
 and noted that the Court 
similarly permitted a protective sweep of a house in Buie based on 
reasonable suspicion.
113
  These cases reflect the general rule that reasonable 
suspicion can only support limited searches for officer safety.
114
  By 
discussing such cases, the Court in Gant impliedly acknowledged that 
reasonable suspicion is limited to searches based on officer safety and that 
an evidentiary search cannot be based on that standard.
115
  It is also 
unlikely that reasonable to believe is a standard lower than reasonable 
suspicion since the latter standard is already extremely low.
116
  If 
                                                                                                                                      
automobile exception after the car and the arrestee had been taken to the police station).  
 109. LAFAVE, supra note 99, at § 7.1(d); Bright Line, supra note 4, at 98 n.139.  
 110. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (discussing the established 
authority to search, not incident to arrest, but for officer safety). 
 111. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 112. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of Belton because, 
inter alia, officer safety is already addressed in settled case law). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that an officer may conduct 
a pat-down search only when there is reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect is 
armed and dangerous). 
 115. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721 (analyzing cases permitting searches based on 
reasonable suspicion for officer safety reasons, but not for evidentiary reasons).  But see 
Myron Moskovitz, The Road to Reason:  Arizona v. Gant and the Search Incident to Arrest 
Doctrine, 79 MISS. L.J. 181, 193–94 (2009) [hereinafter The Road to Reason] (predicting 
that courts will equate reasonable to believe with reasonable suspicion).  
 116. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (stating that reasonable suspicion 
is “considerably” lower than preponderance of the evidence and is less demanding than 
probable cause); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (discussing reasonable 
suspicion as a standard that requires only “some minimal level of objective justification,” 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted), supported by facts 
rather than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 
(1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It can be argued that the reasonable to believe 
standard is no different from the reasonable suspicion standard because both share the 
requirement of reasonability.  See Kinports, supra note 102, at 651 (observing that phrases 
such as reasonable to believe are linguistically similar to reasonable suspicion).  However, 
as discussed in the text, the Gant Court probably did not intend to equate the two standards 
since it did not analyze reasonable suspicion cases in light of the reasonable to believe 
standard, which is used for searches due to officer safety alone, rather than an evidentiary 
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reasonable to believe is a standard lower than probable cause, but not lower 
than reasonable suspicion, it might be an intermediate standard, albeit one 
whose contours are unknown.
117
 
More likely still is that the standard asks whether the crime of arrest was 
an evidentiary crime, rather than entailing a quantum of proof, as do 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
118
  Because the crime of arrest in 
Gant was not evidentiary—no further evidence of driving without a license 
could exist beyond the warrant for Gant’s arrest—a search of the car would 
be unreasonable under Gant’s second holding.
119
  On the other hand, if the 
warrant listed distribution of illegal drugs as the crime, the evidentiary 
nature of the crime would likely justify the search.  This “nature of the 
offense” test finds support in the Gant opinion as the Court claimed that, 
“[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic 
violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains 
relevant evidence.”
120
  The Court stated that in other cases, such as Belton 
and Thornton, where the arrestees were arrested for possession of illegal 
drugs, it would be reasonable to search the car incident to arrest.
121
 
Nevertheless, it is uncertain what exactly the Court intended the standard 
to entail, and its definition will likely be heavily litigated.
122
  Such 
obfuscation on behalf of the Supreme Court bodes ill for lower courts that 
are left with little guidance in applying the standard.
123
 
                                                                                                                                      
rationale.   
 117. See Kinports, supra note 102, at 660 (arguing that phrases akin to reasonable to 
believe may lead to a sliding scale of standards, as opposed to the current reasonable 
suspicion/probable cause dichotomy).  But see Kerr, supra note 99 (“My best guess is that 
‘reasonable to believe’ is the sort of undefined reasonableness used by most lower courts in 
the Payton setting.”) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 
2005)).  
 118. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(d), at 111–12 (stating that the author’s “hunch” is 
that the standard is a “nature-of-the-offense test”); see also United States v. Chavez, No. 
2:09-cr-0033 FCD, 2009 WL 4282111, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov 24, 2009) (disallowing a search 
incident to arrest under Gant’s second holding because it is not reasonable to believe that 
evidence of a battery would be found within the car); People v. Osborne, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
696, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (permitting a search under Gant’s second holding because 
gun possession was an evidentiary crime akin to possession of illicit drugs); Hermele, supra 
note 13, at 186 (stating that Gant’s second holding pertains to evidentiary crimes). 
 119. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Dale Anderson & Dave Cole, Search and Seizure After Arizona v. Gant, 46 ARIZ. 
ATT’Y 14, 16 (2009) (stating that the definition of reasonable to believe is “anybody’s 
guess” and will require lower courts to define it); Timothy H. Everett, Arizona v. Gant:  The 
End of the Belton Rule as we Knew It, 33 CHAMPION 58, 58–59 (Aug. 2009) (noting that the 
Court did not articulate the standard’s relation to reasonable suspicion or probable cause and 
that this issue will be heavily litigated before reappearing at the Supreme Court). 
 123. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the new standard 
will confuse police officers and judges); cf. Kinports, supra note 102, at 650–53 (discussing 
the confusion arising from phrases resembling reasonable to believe). 
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III. GAT’S POTENTIAL TO END AUTOMATIC SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS 
ON THE PERSON INCIDENT TO ARREST 
Gant’s immediate effect is to terminate automatic searches incident to 
arrest in the vehicular context.
124
  The police no longer have the power, as a 
matter of right granted in Belton and extended in Thornton, to 
automatically search a vehicle based solely on an arrest.
125
  Nevertheless, 
automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular contexts continue to 
persist.
126
  Gant abrogated cases such as Robinson, Turner, and Buie by 
terminating automatic searches incident to arrest in the vehicle context.
127
  
The Court severely undermined the concept that the police may search 
incident to arrest as a matter of right.
128
 
A. Strengthening Chimel Beyond the Vehicular Context 
Gant abrogated such a police entitlement by re-anchoring the search 
incident to arrest exception to the twin rationales of Chimel.
129
  Moreover, 
the Gant Court strengthened Chimel by stating that not only must the 
arrestee be within reaching distance to justify a search, but that he also 
must be unsecured.
130
  Chimel did not analyze whether the arrestee must be 
unsecured for police to justifiably search the arrestee’s alleged reaching 
distance, and the opinion omitted the important detail of whether petitioner 
Chimel was handcuffed or otherwise secured when the police searched his 
home.
131
 
Nevertheless, under Chimel’s logic, it seems that if an arrestee is secured 
in handcuffs, his ability to retrieve a weapon or destructible evidence from 
his surrounding area is virtually nonexistent.
132
  While the text of Chimel is 
not immediately clear whether a search is permissible when an arrestee is 
handcuffed, the logic driving the opinion would likely deny a search in 
                                                           
 124. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It must be borne in mind that 
we are speaking here only of a rule automatically permitting a search when the driver or an 
occupant is arrested.”); Everett, supra note 122, at 58–59; see also Anderson & Cole, supra 
note 122, at 14 (noting that Gant ends “free” searches of cars incident to arrest). 
 125. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (rejecting a broad reading of Belton that would violate 
Chimel). 
 126. See supra note 14 (listing cases in the personal container and home context where 
automatic searches incident to arrest persist). 
 127. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720 (asserting that automatic Belton searches are a serious 
threat to privacy).  
 128. See id. at 1721 (stating that allowing automatic warrantless searches as a police 
entitlement is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”).  
 129. Id. at 1719. 
 130. See id. (holding that a search of the passenger compartment of a car is constitutional 
under Chimel when the arrestee is both unsecured and within reaching distance). 
 131. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753 (1969) (stating only that officers 
arrested Chimel by handing him an arrest warrant). 
 132. See id. at 762–63 (explaining that a search is reasonable upon arrest if the suspect is 
able to grab a weapon or destructible evidence). 
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such circumstances since the area surrounding the arrestee would not be in 
his immediate control.
133
  It seems unlikely that a handcuffed arrestee could 
grab a gun from a cabinet, or drugs from a closed container.
134
  If the area 
around the arrestee is not within his immediate control, then the twin 
rationales are not present, as the arrestee cannot reach a weapon with which 
to harm officers or grab evidence to destroy.
135
   
By holding that a vehicle search is permissible under Chimel only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance and unsecured, the Court in Gant 
recognizes that a handcuffed, or otherwise secured arrestee, has little 
opportunity to obtain weapons or destructible evidence.
136
  This 
acknowledgement is evident when the Court claims, “[i]f there is no 
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement 
officers seek to search, both justifications for the search incident to arrest 
exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”
137
  Gant’s first holding 
does not imply that the only situation where an arrestee cannot reach into 
an area officers desire to search is when the arrestee is far removed from 
that area.
138
 
This holding, then, must include situations where the arrestee is 
adequately secured, so as to render his ability to reach the area the police 
seek to search a virtual impossibility.
139
  For example, an unhandcuffed 
arrestee who is surrounded by multiple officers may be adequately 
secured.
140
 
In sum, Gant’s first holding permits officers to search an area incident to 
arrest, other than the person himself, when the arrestee may realistically 
access that area.
141
  This possibility of access is only present when the 
arrestee is not secured and within reaching distance of the space officers 
                                                           
 133. See id. at 763 (allowing a search of the area within an arrestee’s immediate control 
by providing the example of the comparable danger of a gun on a table versus one in a 
drawer); An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 662 (2002) (arguing that Chimel’s 
rule allows a search under an assumption that the arrestee is unrestrained). 
 134. Cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (acknowledging that an arrestee cannot access his 
vehicle when restrained).  But see United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding a search of a cabinet after handcuffing arrestee); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 
840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding a search valid after arrestees were handcuffed and 
monitored by agents). 
 135. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 136. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (elaborating on Chimel’s rule to bar a vehicle search 
when the arrestee is secured). 
 137. Id. at 1716.  
 138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that if the arrestee is in 
handcuffs, the possibility that he will be able to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence is 
extremely low).  
 139. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c) at 104 (“The connector ‘and’ is especially 
significant here, for it tells us that the fact the arrestee is ‘unsecured’ is not good enough if 
he is not also ‘within reaching distance,’ just as being that close is not good enough if that 
arrestee has been secured.”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. § 5.5(a), at 43. 
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seek to search.
142
  The Court not only affirmed Chimel, but has also 
reinvigorated its rule by using Chimel’s internal logic to hold that a secured 
arrestee cannot reach the surrounding area for weapons or evidence.
143
 
Notably, the Court did not limit its elaboration of Chimel to the vehicular 
context.  When it discussed Chimel, the Court in Gant did not qualify its 
language with phrases such as “in the vehicle context” or use other words 
that would confine its Chimel analysis to the automobile sphere.
144
  To the 
contrary, the language used to discuss Chimel is broad.  The Gant Court’s 
use of broad language in its discussion of Chimel leads to the inference that 
the Court did not intend to limit its Chimel analysis to the automobile 
context.
145
   
In contrast, the Court expressly limited its second holding to the 
vehicular context, allowing a search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it 
is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest could be 
discovered.
146
  The Court failed to articulate what circumstances are unique 
to the car context that warrant the adoption of this new evidentiary 
exception, though rationales underpinning the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement are likely the unique circumstances that justify the 
Court’s evidentiary holding.
147
 
In Carroll v. United States,
148
 the Court allowed a search of a car, before 
arrest, upon probable cause that contraband would be found inside.
149
  This 
                                                           
 142. Id. § 6.3(c), at 60. 
 143. See id. (noting the relevance of Gant’s specification that “possibility of access” is 
only necessary when the arrestee is unsecured and is within reaching distance). 
 144. Id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 43 (discussing the two holdings in 
Gant when a search is permissible and noting only the second is limited to the vehicle 
context, and not the first “where there is ‘possibility of access’”). 
 145. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−02 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(applying Gant to a home search); United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 
1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to search of a personal container); 
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 43−44 (mentioning that Gant’s first holding may apply 
to container and premises searches); Anderson & Cole, supra note 122, at 16, at 16 
(predicting that courts will apply Gant to the home context); Craig M. Bradley, Two and a 
Half Cheers for the Court, 45 TRIAL 48, 49 (Aug. 2009) (“Alito was correct when he 
observed that Gant will lead to a reexamination of searches incident to arrest in the home 
and will force courts to recognize that searches of areas near arrestees also may not be 
justified once a suspect has been handcuffed or taken away.”) (emphasis added). 
 146. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also 
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a 
lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might 
be found in the vehicle.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 
615, 632 (2004)); see also Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (holding that Gant’s evidentiary 
holding is confined to the vehicular context); LAFAVE, supra note 99, §5.5(a), at 43 
(suggesting that Gant’s second holding is inapplicable beyond the vehicular context). 
 147. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (justifying the automobile 
exception on a lower expectation of privacy within the automobile); Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that a warrantless automobile search supported by 
probable cause of a crime is lawful due to the mobility inherent in an automobile).  
 148. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 149. Id. at 155. 
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exception is distinct from the search incident to arrest exception, and the 
Court justified this distinction based on the fact that cars are mobile and 
can easily drive away if the police delay a search in an attempt to obtain a 
search warrant.
150
  Another unique characteristic of vehicles to which Gant 
is likely referring is the supposed lower expectation of privacy for 
automobiles, which the Court also has used to justify the automobile 
exception.
151
  Nowhere in the opinion, besides in relation to its second 
holding, does the Court in Gant limit its Chimel analysis to the vehicular 
context.
152
  Therefore, Gant’s robust affirmation of Chimel is applicable in 
other contexts, such as searches of containers on the person as in 
Robinson.
153
  Furthermore, the Court’s concern about automatic searches as 
unjustified police entitlements supports the argument that Gant’s first 
holding should be applied in other automatic, nonvehicular search incident 
to arrest situations.
154
  In his Gant dissent, Justice Alito recognized that 
Gant’s refinement of Chimel can apply to other instances, stating that 
“there is no logical reason why the same rule should not apply to all 
arrestees.”
155
 
The Court’s powerful rhetoric against automatic searches as police 
entitlements reflects a broader concern about the erosion of individual 
privacy resulting from an overly broad search incident to arrest power.
156
  
Since the Court felt that the Belton rule contravenes the primary purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment—to prevent unfettered discretion to search within 
                                                           
 150. Id. at 153.  See generally As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 606–11 (recognizing 
Carroll as the origin of the automobile exception, and explaining the Carrol Court’s 
concern with the impracticality of securing a warrant for an automobile search because of an 
automobile’s mobility). 
 151. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (justifying the automobile exception by claiming that 
one has a lower expectation of privacy in an automobile due to pervasive governmental 
regulation).   
 152. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−02 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(explaining that, except for its second holding, the Gant decision is not strictly limited to the 
automobile context).  
 153. See United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. 
May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to search of a personal container); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 
5.5(a), at 43–44 (arguing that Gant’s requirement of possibility of access, that is when the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance, must be applied in all instances where 
containers are searched incident to arrest). 
 154. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (stating that allowing automatic 
warrantless searches as a police entitlement is “anathema to the Fourth Amendment”).  
 155. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 156. See id. at 1720 (majority opinion) (expressing concern that the police power to 
search incident to arrest for a crime where evidence cannot exist “creates a serious and 
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals” and that this threat “implicates the 
central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police 
officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects”); see also 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (claiming 
that the search incident exception has become a police entitlement right rather than a 
warrant requirement exception justified only by the rationales that justify its existence); 
Everett, supra note 122, at 58 (asserting that the search incident to arrest exception since 
Belton had become a police entitlement). 
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the individual’s private sphere—then Gant calls into question other cases, 
such as Robinson, where courts have upheld automatic searches as a matter 
of right.
157
 
B. Applying Gant to Robinson Prevents a Search of the Cigarette Pack 
In Robinson, the defendant was arrested for the nonevidentiary offense 
of driving with a revoked license,
158
 the same offense for which Gant was 
arrested.
159
  Despite the nonevidentiary nature of the crime, the Court 
upheld the search in Robinson for differing reasons, but essentially 
determined that the power to search a person and containers on the person 
incident to arrest is a matter of right and flows automatically from the arrest 
itself.
160
  Robinson permits automatic searches of a person, and containers 
on the person,
161
 incident to arrest and thereby stands in stark tension with 
Chimel and the elaboration of its rule in Gant.
162
 
Gant’s potential to end automatic searches of persons is less promising 
than its potential to end automatic searches of containers on the person due 
to courts’ emphasis on officer safety.
163
  Since a search of the arrestee’s 
person could easily be justified under Chimel, given that an arrestee is 
within reaching distance of a possible weapon or evidence upon his own 
person, Chimel’s twin rationales would allow the search of a person 
incident to arrest.
164
  Presumably, a search of the person would still be 
lawful even if the arrest were for a nonevidentiary crime, since Chimel’s 
officer safety rationale would still exist even absent the evidence 
preservation rationale.
165
  The search of a person may also be permissible 
under Gant’s affirmation of Chimel since a handcuffed arrestee might 
                                                           
 157. See Bright Line, supra note 4, at 97–98 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s Thornton 
approach abrogates cases upholding automatic searches incident to arrest in nonvehicular 
contexts). 
 158. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 220 (1973). 
 159. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714.  
 160. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that “[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest 
which establishes the authority to search”). 
 161. See supra note 17. 
 162. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 224–25 (noting that the holdings in both Chimel 
and Robinson result from differing Fourth Amendment analyses since the Chimel Court was 
concerned about the scope of a warrant exception whereas the Robinson Court de-
emphasized the warrant requirement). 
 163. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333−34 (1990) (permitting officers to 
search closets and spaces adjoining arrest to look for dangerous persons, without any level 
of suspicion whatsoever); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (permitting a 
search incident to arrest based on, inter alia, concerns for officers’ safety).  
 164. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (concluding that the search of a person is 
reasonable based on rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence); see also 
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 (relying on, inter alia, officer safety and evidence 
preservation to justify a search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest). 
 165. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768 (holding that a search of an area beyond that within 
which the arrestee can obtain weapons or something that could be used against him or her as 
evidence is unreasonable). 
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arguably be able to obtain a small weapon, such as a razor blade, or 
destructible evidence from his pockets. 
Nevertheless, Chimel does not discuss containers on the person, but 
unlike Robinson, presumably does not allow automatic searches of 
containers that are in the possession of the police.
166
  The Court in United 
States v. Chadwick
167
 articulated this point in holding that a search of 
arrestee’s property that is in the exclusive dominion and control of the 
police is impermissible since the arrestee cannot access the property to 
retrieve a weapon or evidence.
168
 
In upholding the search of the cigarette pack in Robinson, the Court did 
not discuss why the Fourth Amendment permits the police to automatically 
search any container found on the person incident to arrest.
169
  This gap in 
Robinson’s reasoning is where Gant could end automatic searches of 
containers on the person incident to arrest.  If the search of Robinson’s 
person is permissible under Chimel, the search of the cigarette pack is 
impermissible under the logic of Gant.
170
  When the officer searched the 
cigarette pack, it was in the exclusive control of the officer, making it very 
unlikely that Robinson could grab it to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence 
inside the pack.
171
  Nevertheless, it is unclear from the text of the case 
whether Robinson was handcuffed, and he arguably had the potential to 
grab the pack from the officer if he was not secured.
172
  The question of 
whether the arrestee was secured, however, does not impact the outcome in 
Robinson. 
Since Robinson held that the authority to search a person incident to 
arrest, in addition to containers on the person, flows from the arrest itself, 
whether the arrestee was handcuffed was irrelevant to the outcome in 
Robinson.
173
  Assuming that Robinson was handcuffed, the result would 
have been the same:  the search of the cigarette pack would have been 
permitted.  However, under Gant, the search would be impermissible since 
                                                           
 166. Compare id. at 762–63 (holding that a search of an arrestee is based on the twin 
rationales), with Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36 (upholding a search of the person and a 
container in which evidence of the crime cannot exist). 
 167. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 168. Id. at 15. 
 169. See DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 224 (noting that the “Robinson Court gave short 
shrift to the search of [the defendant’s] cigarette package after it was removed from his 
pocket”). 
 170. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (holding that where the twin 
rationales are absent, and it is not reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest 
would be found in a vehicle, a search is impermissible).   
 171. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222–23 (1973) (stating that the officer possessed the 
cigarette pack after removing it from the arrestee’s pocket). 
 172. See id. at 234−35 (finding a danger of officer safety in all arrest situations); cf. 
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that a risk that an unrestrained 
driver will attack an officer is present whenever there is a traffic stop).  
 173. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that a search incident to arrest of a person 
and containers on the person needs no greater justification than the arrest itself).  
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a handcuffed arrestee in all likelihood could not grab the pack from the 
officer who had complete custody of it.
174
  Like Rodney Gant, who was 
secured and unable to reach his car,
175
 a secured Robinson would not be 
able to reach into the cigarette pack, even if he were close to the officer 
who possessed it.  Therefore, an automatic search of a personal container 
incident to arrest is unconstitutional in light of Gant. 
C. Perdoma’s Faulty Application of Gant to a Search of a Bag 
At least one case has applied Gant to the search of a personal container 
in the nonvehicular context.  In United States v. Perdoma,
176
 an officer 
confronted Perdoma at a bus station and asked him for identification upon 
detecting the scent of marijuana.
177
  Perdoma claimed he did not have any 
identification, despite the officer’s knowledge that he produced 
identification to buy a bus ticket.
178
  Perdoma then fled upon the officer’s 
demand to see his wallet.
179
  After his arrest for obstructing a police officer, 
the officers  
placed “restraints” on Perdoma, searched his pockets, discovered  
marijuana, contemporaneously searched his bag, and found 
methamphetamine.
180
   
In its ruling on Perdoma’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine,
181
 
the District Court for Nebraska found that the magistrate judge’s 
recommendation to deny the motion was erroneous in light of Gant.
182
  The 
court reasoned that Gant affirmed Chimel’s twin rationales and therefore a 
search incident to arrest was unconstitutional absent those rationales, unless 
Gant’s second holding applied.
183
  The court upheld the search by 
determining that it was reasonable to believe that the bag contained 
evidence of a drug offense since the officer had smelled marijuana, and that 
its discovery provided “additional support” for the reasonable belief that 
more evidence of the drug crime would be found in the bag.
184
 
The court’s application of Gant’s first holding demonstrates that its 
affirmation and elaboration of Chimel must be applied to the nonvehicular 
context since the search incident to arrest exception is now re-attached to 
                                                           
 174. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 175. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715. 
 176. No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *1 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009). 
 177. Id. at *1. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
   181. See Weeks v. United, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (holding that evidence recovered in violation 
of the 4th amendment is inadmissible in federal court). 
 182. Id. at *2. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
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its twin justifications.
185
  The Perdoma court did not apply Robinson, 
which would have upheld the search irrespective of Chimel’s twin 
rationales.
186
  The court expressly rejected the state’s argument that Gant 
only applies to the search of automobiles incident to arrest,
187
 thereby 
rejecting the automatic searches of containers on the person allowed in 
Robinson.
188
  The Perdoma opinion recognizes that officers may not 
lawfully search when the arrestee is handcuffed
189
 and the personal 
container is in the custody of police,
190
 making it a near impossibility for 
the arrestee to gain access to it.  By reconnecting the twin rationales to a 
Chimel search, and realizing that a secured, handcuffed arrestee is 
extremely unlikely to access the area to be searched, Gant supports 
Perdoma’s holding that the twin rationales of officer safety and 
preservation of evidence are inapplicable due to the restraint of the arrestee. 
While the Perdoma court correctly applied Gant’s first holding, it 
incorrectly applied the second holding.
191
  Perdoma failed to consider 
Gant’s express limitation that “circumstances unique to the vehicle 
context” justify a search absent Chimel rationales when it is reasonable to 
believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in the car.
192
  
Those unique characteristics, mobility and lower expectation of privacy, 
are entirely missing when the police seek to search containers, such as the 
backpack in Perdoma. 
Though technically mobile, a bag is not amenable to being whisked 
away as is a car, and it is not susceptible to being moved by the arrestee 
when it is in the control of the police.
193
  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that privacy interests in luggage and other containers on the 
person are substantially higher than automobiles since the former is not 
                                                           
 185. See Everett, supra note 122, at 59 (stating that Gant re-tethers the search incident to 
arrest exception to its justifications, thereby affirming it as an exception to the warrant 
requirement rather than the rule). 
 186. See supra note 160–62 and accompanying text (describing the application of 
Robinson to support the automatic search of containers on the person). 
 187. Perdoma, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2. 
 188. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973). 
 189. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009) (holding that a search is 
impermissible, under Chimel, when the arrestee is secured). 
 190. See supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text (discussing the application of 
Chimel to searches of containers in police custody). 
 191. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding that unique circumstances of the vehicular 
context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest, absent the twin rationales); see also 
United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (explaining that Gant’s 
second holding is limited to the vehicular context).    
 192. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982) (holding that a search of arrestee’s property in 
control of the police is impermissible since the arrestee cannot access that property to obtain 
a weapon or destructible evidence). 
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subject to the public’s view, nor subject to pervasive regulations that 
diminish privacy.
194
 
Not only did Perdoma apply Gant’s second holding when it should not 
have, but it also misapplied it.  The Perdoma court misapplied the second 
holding because it permitted a search for evidence of the crime of arrest 
where evidence of obstructing a peace officer did not exist beyond the 
actual act of flight.
195
  The court’s reasoning, that the aroma of marijuana 
made it reasonable to believe that Perdoma’s bag may contain evidence of 
a drug crime, disregards the fact that Perdoma was not arrested for a drug 
offense.
196
  If Gant were properly applied to the Perdoma case, it would not 
permit a search of the bag because the twin rationales of Chimel would not 
exist where the arrestee was secured and the bag was in the officers’ 
control.
197
  Furthermore, a correct application of Gant would render its 
second holding irrelevant outside the vehicle context. 
The question that naturally follows is, if Gant would not allow a search 
incident to arrest here, would it require the police to obtain a warrant in 
order to search the bag?  The Gant Court found that absent the Chimel 
rationales, and a situation that would activate Gant’s second holding, the 
police would have to get a warrant unless another exception to the warrant 
requirement applied.
198
  In Perdoma, the police would likely have had to 
get a warrant to search the bag since another exception, such as consent or 
exigent circumstances, did not exist. 
A hypothetical analogous to the Perdoma case reflects this outcome.  
Imagine that police officers witness a person wearing a backpack punch 
another person in the face, and then arrest and handcuff him for assault.  If 
they confiscate his backpack, Gant would not permit a search incident to 
arrest, whereas Robinson presumably would.  Applying Gant to these facts 
would not allow the search since the handcuffed arrestee cannot physically 
                                                           
 194. See id. at 13 (recognizing that “[l]uggage contents are not open to public view, 
except as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to 
regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis”).  The Court further noted 
that, “[u]nlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended 
as a repository of personal effects.”  Id.  The Court therefore asserted that a person has a 
“substantially greater” expectation of privacy in personal luggage than in an automobile.  Id.  
 195. Cf. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (holding that the evidence gathering rationale is 
inapplicable to nonevidentiary offenses such as driving with a suspended license). 
 196. Compare United States v. Perdoma, No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *1−2 
(D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (concluding that a search of the defendant’s bag was reasonable as 
a search incident to arrest under Gant’s second holding, despite the fact that the defendant 
was arrested for “obstructing, along with resisting” arrest), with Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 
(permitting searches incident to arrest of vehicles where it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence of the crime of arrest could be found therein). 
 197. Even if the bag were within reaching distance, Chimel may not permit its search if it 
was in police custody since the bag would not be in the area over which the arrestee had 
control.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding that officers may 
search incident to arrest the area “within [the arrestee’s] immediate control”). 
 198. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24. 
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access the bag that is in the police’s dominion and control.
199
  Here, like in 
Perdoma, a proper application of Gant’s first holding would restrict 
officers from searching containers on the person when the person is secured 
so that access to the containers is extremely unlikely. 
Despite its flaws, Perdoma reflects the potential of Gant to limit 
automatic searches of containers on the person, thereby curtailing a police 
entitlement that the Gant Court found repugnant to the Fourth Amendment. 
IV. GAT UNDERMINES AUTOMATIC SEARCHES OF HOMES INCIDENT TO 
ARREST 
Despite Chimel, many courts have disregarded the twin rationales and 
upheld searches of homes when the arrestee was secured and not in 
reaching distance at the time of the search.
200
  Courts have justified these 
searches on the grounds that the arrestee was within reaching distance at 
the time of the arrest, as opposed to the time of the search.
201
  In effect, 
these cases permit automatic searches of the place of arrest in the home as 
they assume that Chimel rationales are always present, even when the 
arrestee has been secured and removed.
202
  Gant abrogates these cases 
because a search of the place of arrest within a home is not justified when 
the arrestee is secured or removed.
203
  A recent case applying Gant to the 
home context is illustrative. 
                                                           
 199. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (disallowing a search if the arrestee is secured); United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1982) (holding that a search of arrestee’s property in control of the police is 
impermissible).  
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding a home search where the arrestee was cuffed and removed from the room of 
arrest); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606, 607–08, 610 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding a 
search of a cabinet after officers handcuffed the arrestee); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 
840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding a search after arrestees were handcuffed and secured by 
federal agents). 
 201. E.g., Turner, 926 F.2d at 888 (“First, we consider whether the baggies of cocaine 
base were within Turner’s immediate control when he was arrested.”) (emphasis added); 
United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the 
reasonableness of a search is tied to the circumstances known to police at the time of arrest). 
 202. See As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 625 (arguing that courts’ focus on the 
arrestee’s position at the time of arrest eliminates the requirement that a search incident to 
arrest must be substantially contemporaneous to the arrest, thereby allowing a search despite 
the twin rationales). 
 203. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001−03 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(utilizing Gant to suppress evidence found in a home when the arrestee was secured in a 
squad car); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 104. (emphasizing that Gant stands for the 
proposition that the arrestee must be both “unsecured” and “within reaching distance” for 
the “possibility of access” to exist). 
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A. Taylor’s Application of Gant in the Home Context 
In United States v. Taylor,
204
 officers arrived at Michael Taylor’s house 
with arrest warrants for unlawful use of a weapon and tampering with a 
witness.
205
  The officers found Taylor hiding in the attic, whereupon they 
brought him downstairs, handcuffed him, and placed him in the police 
cruiser.
206
  An officer then searched the attic and found a handgun allegedly 
lying in an area that was within easy reach of Taylor at the time of his 
arrest.
207
   
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri suppressed the 
gun and found that Gant’s first holding, which strengthened Chimel, does 
apply in contexts other than a vehicular one.
208
  Since Taylor was secured 
in the police cruiser without the possibility of accessing the gun in the attic, 
the twin rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence were not 
present to justify the search.  The court also noted that Gant’s second 
holding did not apply since the unique circumstances surrounding a 
vehicular search confine an evidentiary search based on a reasonable belief 
to the vehicular context.
209
  Taylor’s application of Gant shows its 
applicability to home searches incident to arrest, and undermines cases 
where courts have allowed searches in defiance of Chimel justifications,
210
 
such as United States v. Turner.
211
 
In Turner, the Ninth Circuit upheld a search that violated Chimel since 
the arrestee was handcuffed and removed to an adjacent room before the 
search of the room of arrest.
212
  Because officers detained Turner in an area 
where he could not possibly obtain weapons or evidence, and was detained 
there precisely to remove him from the place of arrest,
213
 the search of the 
room of arrest could not be justified by the twin rationales.
214
  While 
                                                           
 204. 656 F. Supp. 2d 998 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
 205. Id. at 1000. 
 206. Id. at 1000–01. 
 207. Id. at 1001. 
 208. Id. at 1002. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. (stating that cases outside the car context that relied on Belton must be 
reexamined due to Gant). 
 211. 926 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 212. Compare id. at 888 (upholding a search where the arrestee was not within reaching 
distance of the searched area), with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding 
that the search incident exception must be confined to the twin rationales, preservation of 
evidence and officer safety, and is permissible when the area searched is within the 
arrestee’s immediate control). 
 213. Turner, 926 F.2d at 888. 
 214. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that after an arrestee is within police custody, the twin rationales do not apply and 
that it is impossible for the arrestee to grab a weapon or evidence); see also An Empirical 
Reexamination, supra note 67, at 683 (implying that Turner treats the Chimel doctrine as a 
game to justify a search by overlooking the fact that Turner was secured and removed from 
the room).   
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proclaiming fidelity to Chimel, the court nonetheless used a test from a 
Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Fleming,
215
 which distorted Chimel’s 
reasoning.  In using the test, which considered whether the evidence was in 
the defendant’s immediate control at the time of arrest as opposed to time 
of search,
216
 both circuit courts essentially disregarded the twin rationales 
since the defendant at the time of the search was secured and not within 
reaching distance of the evidence.
217
  This test, sometimes known as the 
“now or earlier test,” requires that the arrestee be in reaching distance at the 
time of arrest, and permits the search even after the arrestee has been 
removed from the area.
218
 
Implicit in decisions such as Turner and Fleming is the courts’ concern 
about restricting police authority to search for evidence upon arrest.
219
  
However, this policy preference giving police a right to search absent legal 
justification was robustly rejected in Gant.
220
  The now or earlier rationale 
can no longer be used to uphold searches since Gant explicitly held that a 
search incident to arrest is permissible “only when the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance . . . at the time of the search.”
221
  Since Turner 
was secured in another room, not within reaching distance of the room of 
arrest, Gant would prohibit this search. 
The now or earlier test analyzes the permissibility of a search by asking 
the wrong question.  Under Gant, the question courts must ask is if the 
Chimel rationales are present when the search was conducted, not whether 
they were present at the time of arrest, thereby justifying a search when the 
arrestee has been secured and disabled.
222
  Therefore, Gant abrogates all 
                                                           
 215. 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 216. Turner, 926 F.2d at 887; Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607. 
 217. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing how Gant would not allow a 
search when the arrestee is secured or removed).  
 218. See, e.g., Turner, 926 F.2d at 887–88 (upholding a search of a room after the 
arrestee was moved elsewhere since the area searched was within the arrestee’s immediate 
control at the time of arrest); see also Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607–08 (using the now or earlier 
test to uphold a search).  See generally Bright Line, supra note 4, at 97–98 (arguing that 
Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence could undermine the now or earlier rationale). 
 219. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(maintaining that cases such as Fleming that defy the twin rationales by declining to adopt a 
test that would be “at odds with safe and sensible police procedures” assume that the 
government has a right to search, rather than an exception based on a necessity to search); 
Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607 (declining to adopt a rule requiring a search contemporaneous 
with arrest as it would conflict with “safe and sensible police procedures” of restraining the 
arrestee and removing him from the area of arrest); see also An Empirical Reexamination, 
supra note 67, at 682–83 (stating that the court in Turner assumed that the police had “won 
the right” to search by the mere fact of arrest). 
 220. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting Belton’s rule which 
allowed broad search incident to arrest power as a matter of right).   
 221. Id. (emphasis added); see also LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 103–04 (arguing 
that it is significant that Gant’s rule applies to the time of the search since general police 
practice is to handcuff and remove the arrestee from the immediate vicinity). 
 222. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that after an arrestee is within police custody, the twin rationales do not apply and 
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cases that have used the now or earlier test to permit a search despite the 
absence of the twin rationales. 
B. Gant Undermines an Automatic Buie Search 
In addition to undermining Turner and like cases, Gant may also weaken 
one of the holdings of Maryland v. Buie, which allows automatic searches 
of closets and rooms adjacent to the place of arrest.
223
  While Buie’s second 
holding required reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep of the 
house generally to discover potentially dangerous persons,
224
 its first 
holding allowed a search of closets and other adjacent spaces to discover 
such persons without any evidentiary showing whatsoever.
225
  This 
automatic search power was presumably based on officer safety reasons:  to 
protect officers from attack by an arrestee’s hidden compatriot rather than 
the arrestee himself.
226
 
Buie’s second holding is akin to a Terry frisk, but the thing “frisked” is a 
house rather than a person.
227
  The Buie Court directly analogized to Terry 
in borrowing its reasonable suspicion standard and its sole rationale of 
officer safety for a limited search.
228
  Since a Terry frisk occurs before an 
arrest, in order to eliminate a reasonably perceived risk of harm,
229
 Buie’s 
reasonable suspicion sweep is tied closely with Terry rather than Chimel.
230
 
On the other hand, an automatic Buie sweep is more akin to a search 
incident to arrest since it modifies Chimel to include a search not only of 
the grabbing area of the arrestee, but also of adjoining spaces and closets.
231
  
The majority in Buie stated that Chimel was not at issue and attempted to 
                                                                                                                                      
that it is impossible for the arrestee to grab a weapon or evidence). 
 223. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).  
 224. Id. 
 225. See id. (holding that officers may search adjoining spaces of arrest and closets 
without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion). 
 226. Id.  While the Court did not elaborate on its automatic sweep holding, it is rooted in 
reasons of officer safety since the Court labeled such a sweep a “precautionary matter.”  Id.  
 227. Edward J. Loya, Jr., Sweeping Away the Fourth Amendment, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
457, 465 (2005); see Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33 (analogizing officer safety interests in Terry 
with the present case).   
 228. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33.  
 229. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968) (holding that frisking a suspect before 
the existence of probable cause to arrest must be limited in scope to discover weapons). 
 230. See Loya, supra note 227, at 465 (stating that since a sweep based on reasonable 
suspicion is analogous to a Terry frisk, Terry is instructive regarding the sweep doctrine’s 
contours). 
 231. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. 
Williamson, 250 F. App’x 532, 533 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing an automatic Buie sweep as 
a search incident to arrest); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1438 (noting that an automatic Buie 
sweep is closely aligned with a Chimel search since both require only a lawful arrest); Peter 
W. Fenton & Michael B. Shapiro, Chimel v. California 40 Years Later, CHAMPION, July 
2009, at 50 (“Buie[] extend[ed] Chimel’s application to evidence found in plain view during 
a protective sweep of the premises.”). 
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distinguish that case.
232
  It reasoned that Chimel’s purpose was to retract the 
expansive search incident to arrest power in Rabinowitz that allowed a top 
to bottom search of a house.
233
  The Court also asserted that Chimel was 
concerned about the risk to officer safety arising from the arrestee as 
opposed to a dangerous hidden ally.
234
 
However, these arguments fail to adequately explain how an automatic 
Buie sweep is not an expansion of Chimel.  In his Buie dissent, Justice 
Brennan argued that an automatic sweep of closets and spaces adjacent to 
arrest is an expansion of the search incident to arrest exception because of 
the similarity in the type of presumptions present in Chimel and the 
majority in Buie.
235
  In Chimel, a search of the grabbing area of an arrestee 
is permitted due to a presumption that an arrestee may try to obtain 
weapons or destructible evidence from that area.
236
  Similarly, Justice 
Brennan posited that the Buie majority presumed that “arrestees are likely 
to sprinkle hidden allies throughout the rooms in which they might be 
arrested,” an assumption that Justice Brennan found “much less plausible” 
than the one relied upon in Chimel.
237
  Therefore, while Chimel was 
concerned about expansive house searches incident to arrest, it also at least 
partly founded its rule on the officer safety rationale.
238
 
Furthermore, the Buie majority’s conclusion that Chimel was not at issue 
because Chimel focused on the threat from the arrestee as opposed to third 
parties is flawed.  The majority analogized a protective sweep to a Terry 
frisk and relied heavily on this analogy to justify a protective sweep based 
on reasonable suspicion.
239
  Since Terry was concerned about danger to 
officers arising out of the person to be frisked, rather than dangerous third 
parties,
240
 the majority’s attempt to distinguish Chimel is inconsistent with 
the majority’s own logic in establishing the legal justification for a 
protective sweep. 
However, Buie’s expansion of the search incident to arrest power 
violates the bounds of the exception.
241
  Chimel and Gant do not permit an 
                                                           
 232. Buie, 494 U.S. at 336. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id.  
 235. See id. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s assumption 
that arrestees will keep dangerous confederates in a house is “much less plausible” than the 
Chimel presumption that an arrestee might reach for destructible evidence or a weapon). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (retracting the search incident to 
arrest power to prevent expansive searches and crafting a rule addressing officer safety and 
preservation of evidence.) 
 239. Buie, 494 U.S. at 332–33. 
 240. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (establishing the permissibility of a frisk 
for weapons to protect officers). 
 241. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Buie’s 
expansion of the search incident to arrest power is impermissible since the threat to officer 
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automatic search incident to arrest to look for hidden attackers, but only to 
protect officers from the arrestee and to prevent destruction of evidence by 
the arrestee.
242
  Moreover, Gant realigned the search incident to arrest 
exception as a whole with the underlying twin rationales established in 
Chimel.
243
  In reestablishing the proper scope of the search incident to 
arrest exception, Gant undermines Buie’s expansion of the exception to 
encompass automatic sweeps insofar as the twin rationales underpinning 
the exception need not exist under Buie’s automatic sweep rule.
244
 
A common defense of expanded search power generally, and one 
articulated by the Buie Court, is that of officer safety.
245
  The Buie majority 
stated that a home arrest presents dangers to officers on par with, or greater 
than, those experienced during street encounters.
246
  The Buie Court 
maintained that officers are more vulnerable in an arrestee’s home than in 
other spaces with which they are more familiar, such as a public street or 
highway.
247
 
While such language may have superficial appeal, this argument 
assumes that house ambushes are common enough to warrant an automatic 
sweep.
248
  It is not clear that the danger of a hidden third party inside a 
home is as great or greater than the multitude of other precarious situations 
that are routine in policing.
249
  As noted, Justice Brennan was skeptical that 
                                                                                                                                      
safety in situations like Buie is less believable than that in Chimel). 
 242. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (affirming Chimel’s twin 
rationales of the risk of harm to officers and destruction of evidence by the arrestee); 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (creating the twin rationales in light of risks created by the 
arrestee). 
 243. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716 (stating that Chimel’s restriction of the search to the 
grabbing area “ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with” 
the twin rationales). 
 244. See id. (reaffirming Chimel by stating that there can be no search incident to arrest 
when the twin rationales are absent); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (“The scope of the search 
must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.”) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., 
concurring)). 
 245. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 333 (assuming that officer safety is imperiled in home arrests 
to the same or greater degree as roadside encounters); see also Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 
1070, 1087 (7th Cir. 2005) (asserting that the underlying rationale for a protective sweep is 
officer safety); Sarah E. Rosenberg, Comment, Buie Signals:  Has an Arrest Warrant 
Become a License to Fish in Private Waters?, 41 EMORY L.J. 321, 359 (1992) (observing 
that the Court, as in Buie, will sacrifice individual privacy in light of substantial 
governmental interests such as officer safety). 
 246. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See id. at 342 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the implausibility that an arrestee 
would likely “sprinkle hidden allies throughout the rooms in which they might be arrested”). 
 249. Id. at 340; see also Leslie A. O’Brien, Note, Finding a Reasonable Approach to the 
Extension of the Protective Sweep Doctrine in on-Arrest Situations, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1139, 1164–65 (2007) (arguing that the government’s interest in a search generally does not 
justify the sacrifice of personal privacy).  Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics indicate 
that 19.1 percent of law enforcement officers who were feloniously killed between 1999–
2008 died during a traffic stop or pursuit, whereas 20 percent were feloniously killed as a 
result of an ambush and 23 percent in arrest situations.  FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
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the existence of an arrestee’s dangerous compatriots would be so prevalent 
to justify an automatic sweep, whereas the Chimel assumption that 
arrestees would try to destroy evidence or harm officers was much more 
plausible.
250
 
Even more problematic is that an officer need not even have a subjective 
belief of an ambush since an automatic Buie sweep is permissible as a 
matter of right.
251
  An automatic Buie sweep, while ostensibly premised on 
officer safety, is little more than a police entitlement if it permits an 
automatic search when there is  
no subjective fear of physical violence.  Justice Stevens rightly underscored 
that the searching officer in Buie testified that he did not fear an attack 
from a third party.
252
 
It is precisely this unjustified, automatic search power that the Gant 
majority found abhorrent.  Insofar as the Court in Gant rejected such an 
authority, Gant gravely undermines automatic Buie searches. 
V. OVERCOMING PERVERSE INCENTIVES  
One defense of Belton and cases like Turner that use the now or earlier 
test is that without this automatic search power, the police would have a 
perverse incentive to leave a suspect unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the area the officers seek to search.
253
  Consequently, the 
                                                                                                                                      
INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FELONIOUSLY KILLED AND ASSAULTED, 2008, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2008/data/ figure_04.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2009).  However, note that these statistics do not relate what percentage of officers were 
feloniously killed by a third party during an in-home arrest. 
 250. Buie, 494 U.S. at 342 n.6. 
 251. See id. at 334 (creating the authority to search closets and spaces adjacent to arrest 
as a matter of right); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1438 (denouncing the Buie majority’s 
willingness to sanction “causeless” automatic sweeps in the home).  Because Buie allows 
automatic sweeps, the original reason for the search, to look for attackers, need not exist.  
Case-by-case adjudication of whether an attacker was likely present, or even if the police 
feared an attacker, is the antithesis of a bright-line rule allowing police to search 
automatically.  See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to 
consider the subjective motivations of police actions as long as they are legally justified).  
 252. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337 (Stevens, J. concurring).  The officer in Buie obtained arrest 
warrants for Buie and his alleged accomplice for an armed robbery, but the illogic of the 
Court’s automatic sweep holding is even more palpable for arrests of nonviolent crimes.  
Whether the crime of arrest is failure to pay child support, skipping a court date, or tax 
fraud, Buie gives law enforcement the power to search a closet and adjacent rooms as a 
matter of right despite the unlikelihood of an assailant lying in wait. 
 253. See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing cases that allow a 
search after, not incident to arrest, based on a desire to eliminate a perverse incentive for 
officers); see also United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887–88 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting 
the now or earlier test to prevent creating an incentive for police to leave a potentially 
dangerous arrestee in the area to be searched); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 
(7th Cir. 1982) (arguing that the now or earlier test, which justifies a search after an arrest, is 
superior to a contemporaneity requirement because “it does not make sense to prescribe a 
constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures”).  See 
generally As Time Goes By, supra note 20, at 620–35 (discussing how the now or earlier test 
eliminates the contemporaneity requirement, thereby effectively allowing a warrantless 
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argument goes, officers would be placed in harm’s way due to an 
unrestrained arrestee.  Since Gant’s first holding logically extends to 
nonvehicular contexts, one could argue that there are more situations than 
just roadside arrests where officers would have a perverse incentive to 
manufacture a search by leaving an arrestee unsecured and within reaching 
distance. 
Justice Scalia explained the perverse incentive argument in his Thornton 
concurrence: 
The second defense of the search in this case is that, since the officer 
could have conducted the search at the time of arrest (when the suspect 
was still near the car), he should not be penalized for having taken the 
sensible precaution of securing the suspect in the squad car first.
254
   
In other words, the disadvantage of following safe procedures of 
securing the arrestee is that the twin rationales of Chimel would not allow a 
search.  A recurring refrain from cases using such logic is that “it does not 
make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with 
safe and sensible police procedures.”
255
 
The constitutional test—or more appropriately, the requirement—the 
courts are referring to is that a search incident to arrest  
must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.
256
  This 
contemporaneity requirement is a logical requisite since the very words 
“incident to arrest” connote that the search must occur substantially 
contemporaneously with the arrest.
257
  Otherwise, the search is made after 
an arrest and is not within the purview of the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement.  The other requirement, related to 
contemporaneity, to which the courts are likely referring is one included in 
Gant:  that the arrestee must be within reaching distance at the time of the 
search.
258
  The now or earlier test, on the other hand, forsakes the 
contemporaneity and reaching distance requirements.
259
 
                                                                                                                                      
search when the reasons for the warrant exception are no longer existent). 
 254. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627; see also United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 
669 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (asserting that a court’s exclusive focus on the moment of the search 
“might create a perverse incentive for an arresting officer” to keep an arrestee in an area 
from which he could pose a threat for a longer period of time). 
 255. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting 
United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Turner, 926 F.2d at 888; Fleming, 677 F.2d at 607. 
 256. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (“Once an accused is under 
arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not 
incident to the arrest.”). 
 257. DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 215; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
15 (1977) (holding that a search of a footlocker that occurred an hour after law enforcement 
had exclusive control cannot be incident to arrest); Preston, 376 U.S. at 368 (holding that a 
search of an automobile after it has been towed and after the arrest of the driver is not a 
search incident to arrest). 
 258. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
 259. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (stating that the now or earlier rationale 
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The argument for Belton and the now or earlier test is rife with unsound 
assumptions.  It assumes that without automatic search incident to arrest 
power, police will engage in the unsafe practice of leaving the arrestee 
within the area to be searched to create search authority under Chimel and 
Gant, because the arrestee would be within reaching distance of the space 
to be searched.
260
  However, studies show that police procedures direct 
officers to always secure the arrestee in handcuffs, usually behind the back, 
and to remove the arrestee from the scene as quickly as possible.
261
  These 
procedures indicate that law enforcement value safety and would rather 
restrain and remove an arrestee than leave him unsecured in order to 
manufacture authority to search.
262
 
Nevertheless, officers may still have an incentive to not secure and 
remove an arrestee when the officer believes that the arrestee is of no 
danger to him.
263
  Despite routine police procedure of handcuffing and 
removing the arrestee, it is plausible that an officer would act due to some 
improper motive.
264
  Due to such a motive, and a belief in the peacefulness 
of the arrestee, an officer might purposefully leave an arrestee unsecured 
near a vehicle, or other space, so that he may conduct a search.
265
  Though 
Gant does not explicitly claim that a search conducted based on a 
                                                                                                                                      
justifies a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control at the time of arrest 
rather than at the time of the search). 
 260. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(discussing the perverse incentive of leaving suspects unrestrained to “manufacture 
authority to search”).  Another flaw in the now or earlier, perverse incentive argument, as 
Justice Scalia noted in his Thornton concurrence, is that it “assumes that, one way or 
another, the search must take place.”  Id.  The implicit assumption here is that the police 
must be able to search the area of arrest, even absent the Chimel rationales, thereby creating 
a police entitlement.  According to Justice Scalia’s Thornton concurrence, if safe procedure 
demands restraint and removal of an arrestee, then officers should do so and then not search.  
Id. 
 261. An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 665; see also Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 
1724 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the police almost always conduct a vehicular arrest 
by ordering the arrestee out of the vehicle, handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad 
car). 
 262. See An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 665–66 (analyzing various 
police department procedures and concluding that officers are almost always directed to 
effectuate a safe arrest). 
 263. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring), see also Anderson & Cole, 
supra note 122, at 17 (arguing that Gant creates a perverse incentive that will result in 
police murders if officers are careless and decide to value a search higher than their safety); 
Bradley, supra note 145, at 49 (stating that the Gant Court invites officers to not follow safe 
arrest procedures). 
 264. An officer may seek to manufacture a search based on racially prejudicial grounds, 
or other improper motives such as a desire to assert authority.  Nevertheless, the Court is 
generally unconcerned about the actual motivations of an officer if his actions are supported 
by the appropriate legal justification.  See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(holding that the constitutionality of a traffic stop is not dependent on the “actual 
motivations of the individual officers involved” and that “[s]ubjective intentions play no 
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
 265. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724–25 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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manufactured risk of officer safety or destruction of evidence is inherently 
unconstitutional, a footnote in the opinion implies this conclusion.
266
 
In footnote four, the Court asserted that it would be the rare case where 
an officer “is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of 
access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains.”
267
  The Court maintained that in a 
situation where such a safe arrest is not possible, a search of the vehicle is 
permissible due to the twin rationales.
268
  Arguably, Gant renders a search 
unconstitutional if the officer manufactures authority to search since the 
officer would have been able to safely secure the arrestee, but chose not to 
do so.
269
  The operative word in footnote four is “unable,” which connotes 
impossibility.  An inability, or impossibility, to effectuate a safe arrest is 
the antithesis of an officer intentionally leaving an arrestee unrestrained in 
order to justify a search incident to arrest.
270
  As Justice Scalia articulated 
in his Thornton concurrence, a search incident to arrest cannot be justified 
when officers create the very exigencies—the risk of harm to officers and 
destruction of evidence—that underpin the search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement.
271
 
The fear that Gant creates perverse incentives for officers that will 
endanger their safety assumes that officers value a search more than 
eliminating the risk of physical harm.
272
  This assumption is faulty as it 
presumes irrationality amongst police officers.
273
  To the contrary, as 
studies have shown, officers in the field secure and generally remove 
arrestees from the scene to disable them by virtue of the fact that policing is 
                                                           
 266. See id. at 1719 n.4 (majority opinion) (“Because officers have many means of 
ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is 
unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle 
remains.”); LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 106–07 (viewing the interpretation of the 
majority’s suggestion in Gant “that the question to be decided . . . is whether the officers 
were able to eliminate the ‘possibility of access’” is consistent with allowing a search based 
on “genuine safety or evidentiary concerns”) (emphasis in original). 
 267. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 n.4.  
 268. See id. (stating that a search will not be unreasonable if the officer cannot make an 
arrest so that an arrestee may access the car). 
 269. See id. (noting that officers have numerous means to ensure a safe arrest, thereby 
making it unlikely that officers will be “unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real 
possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains”).  
 270. See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 7.1(c), at 107 (arguing that after Gant, lower courts 
must consider whether officers had the ability to eliminate the arrestee’s possibility of 
access to the area to be searched). 
 271. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also An Empirical Reexamination, supra note 67, at 688 (claiming that it is illogical to 
permit police to conduct a bad-faith search when they do not subjectively fear that the 
arrestee is dangerous). 
 272. See supra note 235. 
 273. See Anderson & Cole, supra note 122, at 17 (acknowledging that Gant only 
increases risk to officers if they indulge in careless, bad-faith searches); see also LAFAVE 
supra note 99, § 5.5(a), at 44 (“Gant should be construed as requiring police to take 
available steps to ensure against such a possibility of access. . . .”). 
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an inherently dangerous profession.
274
  Police are unlikely to risk their 
safety simply to manufacture the authority to conduct a search incident to 
arrest.  Therefore, Gant does not endanger officers in either roadside arrests 
or other nonvehicular situations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court in Gant not only affirmed Chimel, but strengthened it by 
recognizing that a handcuffed, or adequately secured arrestee is not able to 
reach into the area to be searched.
275
  If the arrestee cannot grab a weapon 
to harm officers or obtain destructible evidence, a search would be 
unconstitutional because the rationales underpinning the search incident to 
arrest exception would not be present. 
While Gant introduced an evidence gathering rationale that permits a 
search even when the twin Chimel rationales are absent, this authority only 
lies in the vehicular context.
276
  On the other hand, Gant’s affirmation and 
elaboration of Chimel extends to other contexts, such as searches of 
containers on the person and homes incident to arrest, because the Chimel 
rationales define the scope of this exception to the warrant requirement 
irrespective of what is searched.
277
 
In these nonvehicular contexts, Gant’s logic abrogates cases that have 
permitted automatic searches incident to arrest, and therefore curtails a 
police entitlement that is founded on little more than a desire to provide the 
government with an expansive search power.  Nevertheless, Gant arguably 
creates a perverse incentive for officers to not follow safe arrest procedures 
in an effort to manufacture authority to search and bypass Gant.
278
  
However, such instances are likely to be rare, and Gant itself likely renders 
such bad-faith searches unconstitutional.
279
 
The right to individual privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment 
reflects not only the appropriate respect to be afforded the individual, but 
also a check on the government’s power to unreasonably intrude upon this 
privacy.  Expansive search power is especially pernicious when the law 
permits the government to pry into an individual’s affairs as a matter of 
right.
280
  Gant rightly curtails this power.  Gant’s immediate effect is the 
                                                           
 274. Supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text. 
 275. Supra Part IV. 
 276. Supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
 277. See United States v. Taylor, 656 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1001–03 (E.D. Mo. 2009) 
(suppressing evidence from a home search by applying Gant); United States v. Perdoma, 
No. 8:08CR460, 2009 WL 1490595, at *2 (D. Neb. May 22, 2009) (applying Gant to a 
search of a nonvehicular arrestee’s personal bag).  
 278. Supra Part VI. 
 279. Supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text. 
 280. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009) (asserting that expansive search 
incident to arrest power “implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth 
Amendment—the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at 
will among a person’s private effects”). 
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prohibition of automatic searches incident to arrest in the vehicular context, 
but perhaps its legacy will be the cessation of automatic searches in 
nonvehicular situations that are still conducted merely “[b]ecause the law 
says [the police] can do it.”
281
 
 
 
                                                           
 281. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
